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CRIMINAL LAW-CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS--RoLE OF IN
CAMERA HEARING IN THE QUESTION OF DISCLOSURE OF IN
FORMANT'S IDENTITY~tate v. Wandix, 590 S.W.2d 82 (Mo.
1979).
I.

INTRODUCTION

After three previous proceedings ended in mistrials, Vincent
Wandix was convicted in the Circuit Court for St. Louis County,
Missouri, of selling a controlled substance, heroin. 1 The principal
witnesses against Wandix were Officers Dobbins and Bates of the
St. Louis Police Department. 2 According to the testimony of Offi
cer Dobbins, a confidential informant introduced Officer Dobbins
to Wandix while Officer Bates conducted surveillance from a dis
tance. Following a brief conversation, Wandix instructed Officer
Dobbins and the informant to follow him to a certain address. After
picking up Officer Bates, Officer Dobbins and the informant fol
lowed Wandix to the specified address. Officer Bates was dropped
off before the pair rejoined Wandix. Officer Dobbins entered the
residence with the person identified at trial as Wandix and pur
chased twenty dollars worth of heroin. Officer Dobbins testified
that the informant did not enter the residence but remained in the
car during the transaction. Officer Bates stated that all three en
tered the residence, contradicting Officer Dobbins. Apparently, no
one else was at the address. Both officers identified Wandix in
court as the seller of the heroin. Prior to the investigation neither
officer knew the informant and neither officer used the informant
as a source of information subsequent to the incident in question.
Wandix was not personally known to Officer Dobbins, but Officer
Bates testified that he might have seen him before. 3
Wandix, in his defense, claimed that he was mistakenly
identified as the drug seller. He introduced the testimony of alibi
witnesses and moved for disclosure of the police informant's iden
tity. Defense counsel argued that the informant was the only lay
witness available to support the defendant's alibi testimony and

1. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.020 (1969).
2. State v. Wandix, 590 S.W.2d 82, 83 (Mo. 1979) (en bane), eert. denied, 445
U.S. 972 (1980).

3. Id.
739
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that his testimony was necessary to enable Wandix to receive a fair
trial. 4
The prosecution opposed the motion for disclosure at trial, as
serting that its sources were guaranteed confidentiality under the
informer's privilege which permits the government to maintain the
anonymity of those who communicate information concerning viola
tions of law to law enforcement officials. 5 The motion for disclosure
was denied by the trial judge; at the close of the trial, the jury re
turned a verdict of guilty. 6
The question to be resolved on appeal by the Supreme Court
of Missouri was whether the trial judge abused his discretion by
denying defendant's motion for disclosure of the informant's iden
tity.7 The supreme court, sitting en bane, considered whether the
identity of the informant should have been disclosed in light of the
standards set forth in Roviaro v. United States,S decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1957. The Roviaro Court rea
soned that the informer's privilege belongs to the government and
not to the informant and that "[t]he purpose of the privilege is the
furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law
enforcement."9 By preserving the anonymity of informants the gov
ernment encourages communications to law enforcement officials.
The court, in State v. Wandix,lo summarized Roviaro as
requiring disclosure of the informant's identity when the infor
mant's testimony would be "relevant and crucial"l1 to the defense of

4. Id. at 84.
5. See text accompanying notes 43-53 infra.
6. State v. Wandix, 590 S.W.2d at 83.
7. Id.
8. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
A ... limitation on the applicability of the privilege [of nondisclosure] arises
from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an
informer's identity ... is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused,
or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.
Id. at 60-61 (footnote omitted).
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The
problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the
flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense.
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on
the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's
testimony, anc;l other relevant factors.
Id. at 62. See also text accompanying note 55 infra for the facts of Roviaro.
9. 353 U.S. at 59.
10. 590 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. 1979) (en bane), em. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
11. 590 S.W.2d at 85.
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the accused and when the defendant's need for such testimony out
weighed the state's interest in nondisclosure. 12 Balancing the
competing interests requires consideration of relevant factors on
both sides of the issue. Roviaro and subsequent cases have found
the need for disclosure of the informant's identity to be required in
certain specific situations: When the informant was the sole partici
pant, other than the accused, in tne criminal transaction; or when
he actively participated, or played an integral role, in the crime
charged. 13 The level of the informant's participation in the criminal
transaction for which the defendant is charged becomes particularly
significant when his testimony would be relevant and helpful to the
defense of the accused, most notably in cases in which the infor
mant is the only "witness in a position to amplify or contradict the
testimony of government witnesses."14 In Wandix the state as
serted that disclosure should not be permitted because the accused
failed to show the necessity for the testimony of the informant,
there was no evidence that the informant participated in the trans
action, and the defense failed to show that the informant's testi
mony would be exculpatory. IS
The court was not persuaded by this argument and ordered
disclosure of the informant's identity. The court found that, since
the defense had presented alibi testimony, the sole question was
the identity of the drug seller. Following the "relevant and help
ful"16 standard set forth in Roviaro, the court noted that the testi
mony of an undisclosed informant could be vital to a mistaken
identity defense. 17 The Wandix majority relied on language in
State v. Nafziger,18 which stated that participation did not require
actual involvement by the informant in the crime charged. 19
Rather, Roviaro's participation element could be met and disclo
sure required when the informant was present "at some critical
stage of the proceedings so that he is qualified to testify concerning
essential facts in the case. "20
12. Id. The court, in applying Roviam's standards apparently used the phrases
"relevant and helpful," "relevant and crucial," and "relevant and material" inter
changeably.
13. State v. Davis, 450 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1970); State v. Edwards, 317 S.W.2d
441 (Mo. 1958) (en bane).
14. 353 U.S. at 64.
15. 590 S.W.2d at 85.
16. 353 U.S. at 62.
17. 590 S.W. 2d at 85.
18. 534 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. App. 1975).
19. ld. at 482.
20. ld.
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In a four-to-three decision, the Wandix court found that the
accused's need for the informant's testimony outweighed the state's
interest in preserving the anonymity of its sources. The informant's
testimony was crucial to the accused's defense. Whether the in
formant had entered the residence with Officer Dobbins was
unrelated to a determination of the drug seller's identity; the dis
crepancy between the testimony of Officers Bates and Dobbins, re
garding whether the informant had entered the house, created
doubt as to the reliability of their identification of defendant. The
defense had introduced the testimony of four alibi witnesses, and
since the informant was the only lay witness who could refute the
identification made by the police, his testimony would be "relevant
and material" to the defense. 21 In contrast, the state's interest in
preserving the informant's confidentiality was minimal: The infor
mant was no longer active as a police source; he had provided no in
formation for over a year preceding trial; and no testimony in the
record indicated that the life of the informant would be endan
gered as a result of disclosure. The general policy of the informer's
privilege, therefore, was inadequate to deny disclosure. 22
Justice Rendlen, joined by two other justices, vehemently dis
sented to the majority opinion, stating that the informant was
merely "an observer or minor participant in a criminal transac
tion."23 Justice Rendlen distinguished Roviaro 24 because that case
involved an informant who was the sole participant, other than the
accused, in the offense charged. 25 In addition, when Roviaro con
fronted the informant at the police station subsequent to his arrest,
the informant denied that he knew or had ever seen defendant. 26
The dissent in Wandix thus urged that disclosure is warranted
under Roviaro only when the informant demonstrates a high
level of participation in the crime charged. This view finds support
in the facts of Roviaro but not in the language of the decision.
Justice Rendlen compared Wandix with two other Missouri
decisions, State v. TilcocP7 and State v. Taylor. 28 The informant's
level of involvement in both cases was similar to that in Wandix.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

590 S.W.2d at 86.
Id.
Id.
See discussion of Roviaro at text accompanying notes 53-67 infra.
590 S.W.2d at 88.
Id.
522 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. App. 1975).
508 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. App. 1974).
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Both cases, however, are distinguishable from Wandix. In Tilcock,
the court reserved decision on whether to order disclosure until
sufficient testimony had been given to show the informant's role in
the entire transaction. 29 Defendant in Tilcock was charged with
selling narcotics to an undercover agent. Though the informant had
been present in the bar where the transaction occurred, disclosure
was denied for the following reasons: The informant had not
witnessed a critical stage of the transaction due to the distance be
tween the informant and the drug seller; an undercover officer, po
sitioned between the informant and the accused in a narrow hall
way, had obstructed the informant's view; and the informant's
attention had been diverted continually because he had been act
ing as a lookout. 30 The court also noted that the informant's role in
the transaction was minor so the potential usefulness to the defense
of the informant's testimony was not sufficient to outweigh the
public interest. 31 In fact, the defense failed to make clear to the
court why the informant's testimony was necessary to its case. The
record contains no indication of any discrepancy between the testi
mony of the state witnesses, and it does not show that the accused
sought to develop a defense of mistaken identity.32 The defense
thus failed to establish the need for the testimony of the informant.
Taylor is even less persuasive authority for denying disclosure.
In that case the undercover officer and the informant went to an
apartment, where a number of people were present, to purchase
drugs. The informant was present at the transaction but was not
the sole witness. 33 The identity of defendant, the contents of the
capsules, and defendant's knowledge of the contents were not in
question so defendant's need for the informant's identity was not
compelling. 34 In dicta,the Taylor court stated:
participation alone is not sufficient to require disclosure . . . .
[W]here there is participation plus other factors, such as mis
taken identity, contradictory testimony, or a denial of the accusa
tion, or where the informant is the sole witness, then for pur
poses of fairness the identi'ty [of the informant] may be required
to be disclosed. 35

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
3S.

S22 S.W.2d at 62.
ld.
ld.
S08 S.W.2d at S12.
ld. at S08.
ld. at S12.
ld.
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The dissenting opinion in Wandix 3S ' also asserted that defen
dant failed to meet' the burden of showing that the testimony of the
informant would be relevant, helpful and necessary to ,a fair deter
mination of the cause. 37 By asserting the defense of mistaken iden
tity and by introducing the testimony of alibi witnesses, however,
appellant clearly revealed to the court the necessity for, and the'
substance of, the informant's testimony. The record shows that de
fendant's request for disclosure was much more than mere ,s,pec'ula
tion' andconjecture.
"
"
The dissenting justices also would deny disclosure in :Wandix
ont}:le basis of Justice Rendlen's theory that defendant 'was 'aware'
of the informant's identity 'and thus was capable of calling him 'as a
witness. 38 This assumption is drawn solely from the testimony of
the undercover officers and ignores the affirmative defense of mis-,
taken identity, buttressed by the testimony of alibi witnesses" set
forth in, Wandix. 39 In Roviaro, the 'prosecution had opposed, de
fendant's motion for disclosure, by asserting that defendant knew
the informant's identity.4o The Court noted that when the prosecu
tion's claims are contradicted by testimony and the trial court
makes no factual finding that the defendant knew the identity of
the informant, it cannot be assumed that the informant was known
to the defendant or available to him as a witness. 41 The trial judge
in Wandix made no such factual finding.
This approach, not acknowledged by the dissent in Wandix,
recognizes that, even if the prosecution is correct in its allegation
that the defendant knew the identity of the informant, the informa
tion may be useless to him: The defendant may know the inform
ant only by an alias; the informant may have relocated and adopted
a new identity; or the prosecution may be concealing the location
of the informant. The majority of the Wandix court sought to pre
vent the government from shifting the responsibility for producing
the informant at trial to the defendant simply by alleging that the
informant and the defendant were acquainted.
The disparity between the Wandix majority and dissent pro
vides telling evidence that an intermediate method of resolving the
disclosure question is needed. Under Roviaro the need for disclo
590 S.W.2d at 92 (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
[d. at 90.
38. Id. at 92.
39. 353 U.S. at 60 n.7.
40. Id. at n.B.
41. [d.
36.
37.
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sure must be established with evidence that is more than specula
tive or conjectural. This principle has a natural corollary: the trial
court's decision also should be based on more than mere specula
tion and conjecture. The Missouri Supreme Court should have re
manded Wandix to the trial court with instructions to conduct an
in camera hearing at which the interests of the defendant and the
state could be balanced. A judge may balance the conflicting inter
ests of the parties only if he had the critical information before
him. The only way such information may be placed properly before
him without prejudice to either party is via an in camera hearing.
The facts of Wandix are particularly suited to the in camera pro
ceeding, but a hearing may be even more crucial in instances in
which the facts, or the defense relied upon, make it difficult for the
defense to demonstrate the need for the informant's testimony.42

II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF INFORMER PRIVILEGE

The privilege of confidentiality granted to communications
made by informants to government officials historically has be
longed to the government and not to th'e informant since it is
based on the public policy of encouraging communications to law
enforcement agencies. 43 Early cases held that disclosure of an in
formant's identity was within the absolute discretion of the govern
ment "to be exercised according to its views of what the interests
of the public require."44 In Vogel v. Gruaz 45 the United States Su
preme Court stated: "[p]ublic policy will protect all such communi
cations, absolutely, and without reference to the motive or intent
of the informer or the question of probable cause . . . . ':46 Further,
it was deemed to be the right and duty of every citizen to commu
nicate knowledge of violations of law to government officials in con
fidence, and it was the duty of the government to assure that the
right could be exercised freely, without threat of violence. 47
42. For discussion of related topics which are beyond the scope of this note,
see ]. Hatchett, Discovering the Identity of the Informers, 46 FLA. B.]. 644 (1972)'
(disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant with respect to probable
cause); Comment, Defendant's Right to a Confidential Informant's Identity, 40 LA.
L. REv. 147 (1979) (concerning the issue of disclosure in light of the defendant's
sixth amendment rights).
43. Annot., 83 L. Ed. 155 (1939).
44. Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 488-89\ (1872).
\
45. 110 U.S. 311 (1884).
46. Id. at 315.
47. In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895). The court stated:
It is the duty of the government to see that he may exercise this right freely,
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In Missouri, the informer's privilege was recognized in State
v. Bailey. 48 It granted to law enforcement officials the unqualified
right to withhold an informant's identity.49 The privilege was sub
ject to one limitation: disclosure of the informant's identity would
be required when necessary to show the innocence of the ac
cused. 50 The right of an accused to exculpatory testimony and a fair
trial was considered to be of greater importance to the system of
justice than preserving the anonymity of the informant.
Although the privilege retained its basic form, courts found
ways to avoid applying it rigidly. The privilege against disclosure
became absolute with respect to mere informers or tipsters. 51 Dis
closure, however, could be ordered if an informant actively partici
pated in the criminal transaction for which the defendant was
charged or if his identity was essential to the defense. 52 It was at
this stage of the privilege's evolution that Roviaro was decided. In
1957 Roviaro announced the modern approach to informer commu
nications: disclosure of the informant's identity depends upon the
conflicting interests existing within the framework of each case. 53
The critical elements to be ascertained and evaluated are the level
of the informant's activities in the crime charged, the defendant's
need for the informant's testimony, and the degree of public inter
est. 54
In Roviaro the informant was the only participant and witness,
other than the seller, in a drug transaction that took place in the
informant's car. A federal agent hid in the trunk to monitor the
conversation. Another agent saw defendant alight from the car,

and to protect him from violence while so doing. This duty does not arise
solely from the interest of the party concerned, but from the necessity of the
government itself, that its service shall be free from the adverse influence of
force and fraud practised on its agents....
[d. at 536.
48. 320 Mo. 271, 8 S.W.2d 57 (1928).
49. It would be against public policy to compel a sheriff or other officer to
disclose the identity of the person or persons who inform him of facts
tending to show that a given person is guilty of felony. If information of this
character cannot be given to an officer freely and without fear on the part of
the informant that his part in the arrest and prosecution of one suspected of
felony will be made public, the detection and prosecution of crime will be
intolerably hampered and be defeated altogether in many instances.
[d. at 277,8 S.W.2d at 59.
SO. Annot., 83 L. Ed. 155, 157 (1939).
51. Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1947).
52. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938).
53. 353 U.S. at 60-61.
54. [d. at 62.
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walk to a tree, and then return to the car. Defendant made a
motion as if he were depositing a package in the car, waved to the
informant, and walked away. Roviaro was arrested at his home
later that night and taken to police headquarters where he was
confronted by the informant who denied he knew or had ever seen
Roviaro. 55 Despite defense motions for disclosure, the government
refused to produce the informant at trial. Defendant was convicted.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground
that the informant was the sole participant, other than the accused,
in the transaction charged. 56 Thus "[ t]he informer was the only
witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of the
government witnesses."57 The Court hypothesized that, since the
informant had helped to set up the occurrence and had played a
prominent part in it, "[h]is testimony might have disclosed an
entrapment. He might have thrown doubt upon . . . [the defen
dant's] identity or on the identity of the package. "58
Roviaro, however, did not limit disclosure to those cases in
which the informant is the sole participant, other than the accused,
in the crime charged. Rather, the Court stated that the question of
disclosure requires a balancing of conflicting interests on a case-by
case basis. "Whether a proper balance renders non-disclosure erro
neous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case,
taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses,
the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other rel
evant factors."59
Rovario is significant because it permitted the trial court to
exercise discretion in "balancing the public interest . . . [with]
the individual's right to prepare his defense,"6o as mandated by the
"fundamental requirements of fairness."61 The decision as to the
appropriateness and necessity of disclosing the informant's identity
thus was vested in the trial court, to be determined by considering
all relevant factors according to the standards set forth in Roviaro.

III. IMPACT OF ROVIARO ON THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE
The Roviaro Court recognized that a rigid rule could not
achieve the goals of guaranteeing a fair trial to an accused and ulti
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
[d.

at 58.
at 64-65.
at 64.
at 62.
at 60.
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mately attaining justice. For this reason, the Court established the
"balancing of interests" test to determine the appropriateness of
disclosure. 62 Factors that the court must consider are "the crime
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the in
former's testimony, and other relevant factors. "63 The court's task
is to balance the public interest in protecting the free flow of infor
mation by maintaining the anonymity of the informant against the
individual's right to prepare his defense. 64 Factors that weigh in
the public interest include the continued activity of the informant
in other investigations, the potential danger to the informant if his
identity is disclosed, the credibility of the informant, and the in
herent difficulty in recruiting informants if their anonymity cannot
be guaranteed. 65
Despite the rigid interpretation urged by Justice Rendlen in
his dissent in Wandix,66 few courts have limited disclosure to the
narrow facts of Roviaro. 67 Many courts have required that the in
formant be an active participant in the crime before disclosure will
be allowed, but the exact level and nature of the informant's activ
ity is the subject of much dispute. 68 In State v. Milligan 69 the New
Jersey Supreme Court refused to require disclosure of an infor
mant's identity when defendant denied making the sale of drugs to
an undercover officer. The officer testified that he had been intro

62. Id. at 61-62.
63. Id. at 62.
64. Id.
65. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
66. Justice Rendlen's narrow reading of Roviaro is discussed in text accompa
nying notes 23-26 supra.
67. 353 U.S. at 57-58. The informant, who was in the front seat of the car with
defendant while the agent hid in the trunk, paid for and received the narcotics from
the seller. The informant was the sale participant, other than defendant, in the crime
charged.
68. In State v. Milligan, 71 N.J. 373, 365 A.2d 914 (1976), the informant intro
duced the undercover policeman to the defendant, was present throughout the meet
ing, participated in the general discussion, and went to the defendant's house with
them. He did not negotiate the sale and was in the bathroom when the sale took
place. The court held that disclosure was not required since the informant's im'olve
ment was marginal, and the significance of his testimony was "speculative." Id. at
394, 365 A.2d at 925.
In United States v. Alonzo, 571 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847
(1978), the informant was present when the narcotics transaction occurred, but his
level of participation was not great enough to make disclosure of his identity "rele
vant and helpful" to the defense, absent a showing by the defendant that the inform
ant's testimony was necessary beyond mere speculation. Id. at 1387.
69. 71 N.J. 373, 365 A.2d 914 (1976). See also note 68 supra.

1981]

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

749

duced to defendant by the informant who was present throughout
the meeting and participated in the general discussion. The infor
mant, however, neither negotiated the sale nor participated in or
witnessed the actual transaction. 7o Although essentially relying on a
defense of mistaken identity, defendant made no special showing
that disclosure of the informant's identity would have been helpful
to his defense. 71 Defendant testified on his own behalf, claiming
that he was unable to recall his activities on the day in question
since the alleged transaction took place six months before his arrest
and indictment. Defendant denied that he had ever seen the po
lice officer before the trial and denied selling narcotics on the
date alleged. 72 The court found that the mere possibility that the
informant's testimony might establish a defense of mistaken iden
tity was too speculative to warrant disclosure in view of the infor
mant's limited involvement in the transaction and the fact that the
transaction took place in defendant's home and not on the street. 73
Decisions involving informants have not been uniform in al
lowing disclosure even when the informant witnessed both the ne
gotiations and the transaction. 74 In United States v. Davis 75 the
court refused to require disclosure even though the informant had
introduced two narcotics agents to defendant. The court observed
that the informer did not bargain, pay for, or receive the drugs. Al
though the informant was present at the transaction and undoubt
edly contributed to the "atmosphere of confidence" that induced
defendant to deal with the agents, the court determined that dis
closure would not aid a defense based solely on mistaken iden
tity.76
Davis is distinguishable from Wandix on its facts. In Davis,
two agents dealt directly with defendant on two occasions. During
the course of the investigation both agents filed written reports ac
70. Id. at 379, 365 A.2d at 917.
71. Id. at 390, 365 A.2d at 923.
72. Id. at 392, 365 A.2d at 924.
73. Id. at 391, 365 A.2d at 924.
74. United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1973). In State v. Taylor,
508 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. App. 1974), the court, emphasizing the purpose of the privilege
to protect the public interest in effective law enforcement, held that no disclosure
was required of an informant who made the initial offer to buy narcotics from the de
fendant, and was present at the transaction, but was not the sole witness or partici
pant. See text accompanying note 18 supra. See also State v. Yates, 442 S.W.2d 21
(Mo. 1969) discussed in text accompanying notes 80 & 82 infra.
75. 487 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1973).
76. Id. at 1251 (quoting Gilmore v. United States, 256 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir.
1958)).
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curately describing the accused's physical appearance, including a
tatoo. Defendant was the registered owner of the automobile used
during the two transactions. 77 Such corroborating details clearly
were absent in Wandix. Additionally, Davis was the sole witness in
his own behalf; despite his assertion of mistaken identity, he intro
duced no alibi testimony and did not contradict the two agents'. tes
timony.78 Thus, defendant's need for identification of the informant
would not have been sufficient to outweigh the state's interest
since, in the absence of contradictory testimony, the assumption
persists that the informant will corroborate the police testimony.
Such an assumption is necessary in light of other interests in
denying disclosure that lie at the heart of the informer's privi
lege. 79
State v. Yates 80 held that disclosure was not required on the
basis of facts that revealed that the informant accompanied an
officer to the premises; entered the premises with him, and wit
nessed the transaction but did not actively participate in the crimi
nal offense. The court noted that other lay witnesses who were
present at the transaction in defendant's home were available to
testify as to defendant's asserted noninvolvement. Disclosure, there
fore, was held to be unnecessary. 81
On the other hand, some courts have required disclosure on
the basis of much less compelling levels of participation, apparently
to assure the defendant an adequate opportunity to prepare his de
fense. The court in People v. Williams 82 was faced with facts simi
lar to those present in Davis 83 and Taylor.84 The Williams court
ordered disclosure of the identity of an informant who introduced a
police agent to a drug seller he knew. Defense counsel asserted
that the officer, who was the only witness for the prosecution, saw
the drug seller for only a few minutes three months prior to d~
fendant's arrest and indictment. The informant was deemed to
have been instrumental in bringing about the transaction so his tes
timony was material to a defense of mistaken identity. The court
recognized that prior cases generally required disclosure when the

77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

[d.
[d. at 1250.
See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
442 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1969).
[d. at 26.
51 Cal. 2d 355, 333 P.2d 19 (1958).
See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
508 S.W. 2d at 506. See also text accompanying notes 28-35 supra.
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informant had 'participated in the crime but noted that disclosure
was not restricted to such instances "since it is based upon materi
ality of the informer's identity to the defense."85 In Gilmore v.
United States 86 an informant did more than merely supply informa
tion when he introduced the undercover agent to the drug seller.
The court found that the informant "was an active participant in
setting the stage, in creating the atmosphere of confidence before
hand and in continuing it by his close presence during the mo
ments of critical conversation. "87 According to the testimony of the
undercover narcotics agent, defendant's only connection with the
heroin found in the agent's car was the conversation between the
two which occurred in a tavern. The informant was shown to have
been within hearing distance of this conversation. Due to the na
ture of the transaction, the conversation was the crucial event. 88 In
requiring disclosure of the informant's identity, the court also ob
served that, in view of his possible motives and interest, the in
formant's testimony might be relevant to his credibility.
The jury might well have considered it important in passing on
credibility to know whether charges . . . were or were not then
pending against. , . [the informant], whether immunity or pref
erence had been promised him if he undertook to work up or
work on other cases, whether he was an addict, whether he had
previously known defendant or had dealings with him that might
have given rise to the hope of vengeance, and the like. 89

By alluding to the informant's motives, the court looked beyond his
involvement in the transaction in question to other factors which
could be of importance when the informant was confronted with the
defendant's alibi testimony or the assertion of an entrapment de
fense. An additional factor favoring disclosure was that the govern
ment's objection was based solely on the traditional privilege. 90
Once the defense had demonstrated the need for the informant's
testimony, the government was required to specify why disclosure

85. 51 Cal. 2d at 359, 333 P.2d at 21.
86. 256 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1958). An agent and defendant negotiated a narcotics
sale in a tavern. The infonnant was present during part of the negotiations. The
drugs were placed on the front of the agent's car where he subsequently found them.
Id. at 566-67.
87. Id. at 567.

88. Id.
Id.
90. Id. at 566.

89.
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should not be permitted. The government would prevail if its in
terests outweighed those of the defense. 91
The requirement of participation was further relaxed in State
v. Najziger,92 in which the accused defended himself on the basis
of mistaken identity. The informant's identity was ordered revealed
since he was the only witness to the drug transaction other than
the police officer and a person known only as "Bill." The court
found that the informant's testimony was "relevant and material" to
the identity of the drug seller,93 emphasizing that "no effort was
made by the state to present any facts to weigh the scales toward
nondisclosure. "94 The court also observed that "[i]n a case
involving an identity question, mere presence of the informant and
the opportunity to observe the alleged violator and, therefore, be
in a position to either support the State's identification testimony
or weaken it, becomes critical. "95
One point generally agreed upon in cases dealing with the is
sue of disclosure of an informant's identity is that the defendant has
the burden of showing the necessity for disclosure and of
demonstrating that the informant's testimony would be helpful and
relevant to the defense. One area of inconsistency among the
Courts, however, is in the type of showing the defendant must
make. Roviaro suggests that certain affirmative defenses, such as
entrapment, mistaken identity, or mistake with respect to the con
tents of a package, may require disclosure after the competing in
terests in the case have been balanced. 96 Subsequent decisions
91. ld. In United States v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1980), the possible
motives of an informant were recognized in a case in which the informant testified at
trial. The Ninth Circuit approved cautionary instructions given to the jury, directing
them
that an informant's testimony is to be examined with greater care than that
of an ordinary witness . . . to determine whether the testimony of the in
former was affected by self interest and by prejudice against the defendant,
... that the informer, as an immunized witness, may have realized that his
freedom might depend on incriminating another and that this could be a
motive falsify his testimony.
ld. at 812. Although not required to so rule in the case before them, the court also
noted that the judge may instruct the jury as to the credibility of a witness-informant
who is a drug addict if that fact is established. Id.
92. 534 S.W.2d 480 (1975) cited in State v. Wandix, 590 S.W.2d at 85 (majority
opinion). An informant and an officer went to a house where six to eleven people
were present. The informant witnessed the negotiation and sale of drugs to the offi
cer.
93. ld. at 482.
94. ld. at 484.
95. ld. at 482.
96. 353 U.S. at 64.
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demonstrate that merely alleging the defense, without more, will
not compel disclosure nor even require the prosecution to assert
more than the traditional privilege. In such an instance the privi
lege is presumed, and the prosecution need not offer specific rea
sons why the identity of the particular informant should not be re
vealed.
Several cases illustrate the showing that the defense must
ma,ke. In United States v. Coke 97 the court refused to order disclo
sure because defendant made no showing that the informant's iden
tity would be relevant and helpful to his defense or essential to a
fair trial. Further, the defense sought the informant's testimony on
the question of mistaken identity on appeal, rather than at the
trial. 98 In another decision, a motion for disclosure again was
denied when the informant's identity was sought to support a
motion to suppress evidence seized and not to prove the value of
the informant's identity to the defense. 99 In a third instance, de
fense counsel made no showing that the informant's testimony
might help to establish defendant's innocence. 1OO Other courts
have refused disclosure on similar grounds: When the defense
merely speculates as to the relevancy of the informant's testi
mony;lOl or when the request for disclosure is made solely to es
tablish the informant's reliability and the defense has failed to in
97. 339 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1964). An informant introduced defendant to the nar
cotics agent. The court found that he had been significantly involved in the criminal
events. See also United States v. Russ, 362 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1966).
98. [d. at 184. See also State v. Thompkins, 515 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1974). De
fense counsel's objection at trial to the court's refusal to require disclosure was based
on the sole grou\1d that he was entitled to the names of all persons present at a con
versation between the police officer and defendant at the time of the sale. [d. at 811.
Defense counsel did not request disclosure of the informant's identity on the ground
that it would cast doubt on the officer's positive identification of defendant until the
c~se was appealed. [d. In addition, defense made no effort to call a known witness to
the transaction, although he apparently was in a position to refute the officer's identi
fication of the defendant. [d.
99. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
100. Defendant made no special showing that the informant's testimony would
be helpful to his defense. The court found that the possibility that an informant's tes
timony might establish a defense of mistaken identity was too speculative to warrant
disclosure. State v. Milligan, 71 N.J. 373, 365 A.2d 914 (1976).
101. See text accompanying notes 69-73 supra. In United States v. Estrella, 567
F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1977), the court emphasized that "mere speculation as to the use
fulness of the informant's testimony . . . is insufficient to justify disclosure of his
identity." [d. at 1153. The defendant must indicate some concrete circumstances that
might justify overcoming both the public interest in encouraging the flow of informa
tion ... and the informant's private interest in his own safety." [d. See also United
States v. Kelly, 449 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1971).
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troduce evidence or testimony in support of its motions. 102 A lucid
comment on the defense burden was made by Justice Traynor of
the California Supreme Court: "[t]hey need not prove conclusively
before disclosure the very fact they seek to obtain through disclo
sure. Such certainty of proof is not required as a foundation for ob
taining the identity of an informer who might be helpful to the de
fense of the accused. "103
Courts have required disclosure when the defense merely
moved for disclosure but the state failed to present facts to rebut
the need for it. The bare allegation by the state that the infor
mant's life would be endangered has been held insufficient to deny
disclosute. 104 In State v. Davis,105 the informant and the drug
seller were the sole participants in the crime charged. There was
no testimony that the informant's safety would be threatened by
disclosure. The court noted that the state's failure to call the in
formant as a witness raised "an unfavorable inference that his testi
mony would have been favorable to and would have corroborated
that of defendant. "106
As these cases demonstrate, the flexible standards set forth in
Roviaro have bee~ applied inconsistently.107 This disparate treat
ment of Roviaro's significant factors has resulted in uncertainty and
confusion among defense attorneys and judges as to the magnitude
of the burden that the defense must bear before disclosure will be
ordered. Conversely, the courts have shown deference toward the
government's interests even though the substance of the infor
mant's testimony is accessible to the prosecution exclusively. Ironi
cally, when such deference is shown, the trial judge, who must
balance the parties' conflicting interests, bases his decision on inad
equate information.

IV.

THE

ROVIARO DILEMMA AND

THE IN CAMERA

PROCEEDING

There is little dispute that the government and law enforce
ment agencies are privileged to withhold the names of those who
102. State v. Hubble, 494 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. App. 1973). The court found it to be
of "paramount importance that counsel for defendant at no time, directly or by innu
endo, advised the trial court that disclosure of the informant's identity would consti
tute a means of throwing doubt on the defendant's identity as the person who
committed the crime charged." Id. at 361.
103. People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 773-74,44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 328, 401 P.2d
934,936 (1965) (en bane).
104. State v. Nafziger, 534 S.W.2d at 484.
105. 450 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1970).
106. Id. at 173.
107. Roviaro's 'flexible standards are listed in text accompanying notes 53-54
supra.
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communicate information concerning possible violations of law. The
rationale for the privilege is simply that: "[c]ommunications of this
kind ought to receive encouragement. They are discouraged if the
informer's identity is disclosed."108 The privilege, however, is lim
ited by society's interest in assuring a fair trial for one accused of a
. crime, in deterring illegal actions by law enforcement officials, and
in discouraging the communication of false information by those
who supply such information. l09 One conclusion can clearly be
drawn from the post-Roviaro decisions: the trial courts have diffi
culty applying Roviaro's elusive standards to the sparse facts usu
ally before them and in reaching a decision that is fundamentally
fair. "In the informer situation the burden placed upon the trial
judge is great since he must often balance conflicting interests
without being aware of what relevant information, if any, the in
former possesses. "110 It is apparent from many decisions that the
balancing required by Roviaro has been conducted largely by spec
ulation since the value of the informant's testimony would be diffi
cult to ascertain if not produced in court. 11l
This conundrum has been eased in some federal courts by
conducting in camera hearings on the question of disclosure,1l2
These proceedings enable the trial judge to balance the conflicting
interests outside the courtroom by allowing him to question the in
formant and thereby to assess the potential value of his testimony
to the defense. In camera hearings also allow the court to deter
mine the informant's role in the pending action, any reward or
benefit promised to him for providing information, his drug use or
possible addiction, charges pending against him, his degree of in
volvement in ongoing investigations, and potential danger to him if
his identity were disclosed in open court. 113 A record of the hear
ing is preserved for review in the event of appeal. In camera pro
ceedings may be conducted by affidavit, or the judge may require
the informant to appear in chambers for examination. The hearings
may be adversarial if the judge so rules; but, if counsel for one
108. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374, at 761-62 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
109. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND FOR STATE COURTS
510-18-19 (1980).
110. United States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825, 827 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 932 (1968).
111. See generally, J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 90, ~ 510.06, at
510-34-46.
112. United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v.
Jackson, 384 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
113. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 90, at 510-25.
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party is allowed to attend, all counsel should be pennitted to at
tend. Those present are enjoined from revealing the testimony or
identity of the informant. 114
Justice McLaughlin, in a compelling concurring opinion in
United States v. Day, U5 considered the difficulty encountered by
the trial judge in balancing the conflicting interests of the defense
and the state as "the practical incapacitation to look beyond a mere
statement of facts and evaluate the interests concerned. "116 He
further noted that "a trial judge is not privy to the activities or
cognition of an infonner and unless the court is aided by evidence
from collateral sources it must indulge in a judicial guessing game
and rule in favor of one interest at th,e possible expense of the
other."U7 The judge noted that an in camera proceeding is an ap
propriate "collateral source" since Roviaro vested in the trial judge
the power to use his discretion in resolving the issue of disclosure.
The in camera hearing is a crucial tool in rendering a fundamen
tally fair decision. us
Justice McLaughlin's opinion has been cited with approval in
later decisions that have recognized the tremendous burden on the
trial judge to balance the conflicting interests when he must rule
without benefit of the informant's testimony.U9 The Eighth Circuit

114. See generally, Annot., 1 LEd. 2d 1998-2011 (1957) (Later Case Servo
Supp. 1980).
115. 384 F.2d 464, 466 (3d Cir, 1967) (McLaughlin, J., concurring). The major
ity found it unnecessary to reach the question of the in camera hearing conducted by
the trial judge.
116. The judge continued:
In most situations the accused will demand disclosure in the hope that the
informer's testimony can substantiate his defense. But if disclosure on a
mere supposition is required in every instance the interests of law enforce
ment in combatting the illegal narcotics traffic will be detrimentally affected
by the emasculation of its only effective weapon-the informer.
Id. at 469.
117. Id. at 470.
118. Id.
119. With respect to an in camera hearing in which the informant testified un
der oath as to his knowledge of the crime, the Jackson court stated: "The advantage
of the procedure is that it enables the court to view with a keener perspective the
factual circumstances upon which it must rule and attaches to the court's ruling a
more abiding sense of fairness than could otherwise have been realized." United
States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825, 827 (3d Cir. 1967).
In United States v. Lloyd, 400 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1968), the court remanded the
case to the district court with instructions to conduct an in camera proceeding "for
the purpose of determining whether disclosure of the informer's identity would have
been relevant and helpful to the defendant in presenting her defense, and whether
the informer was available as a witness." Id. at 417.
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has suggested that in camera hearings on the issue of disclosure are
essential to a fair balance of the conflicting interests. 120 More sig
nificant, the United States Supreme Court has approved of the in
camera proceeding as a vehicle for resolving the disclosure is
sue. 121 ''!be Fifth Circuit has accepted post-trial in camera examina
tion of the informant to test the informant's ability to identify the
defendant. 122 It should be noted that merely holding an in camera

120. United States v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 908 (1973). See also United States v. Rawlinson, 487 F.2d 5 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974):
[I]iI most situations an in camera hearing provides a salutary means by
which to satisfY the balancing of interests required by Roviaro. The interests
of law enforcement are served by protecting the identity of the informant ex
cept where a need is demonstrated for disclosure by the informant's own
testimony, and not by the speculative claims of the defendant. A fair trial is
promoted by requiring disclosure whenever the in camera hearing demon
. strates that the informant's identity would be 'relevant and helpful' ....
Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
121. The United States Supreme Court recognized the value of the in camera
hearing on the issue of disclosure and mandated such proceedings in the PROPOSED
R. EVID. FOR U.S. CTS. & MAGISTRATES 510, promulgated in 1972. Congress, how
ever, did not include the rules pertaining to privileges that had been proposed by
the Court in the FED. R. EVID., subsequently adopted. Congress substituted R. 501
in place of the 13 rules proposed. R. 501 left the law of privileges in its present state,
and further provided that privileges shall continue to be developed by the courts of
the United States under a uniform standard applicable in both civil and criminal
cases. The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted on Dec. 16, 1974, were signed
into law on Jan. 2, 1975, became effective on July 1, 1975, and are codified as 28
U.S.C. ~~ 1731-1746. Proposed Rule 510 states:
(2) Testimony on merits. If it appears from the evidence in the case or from
other showing by a party that an informer may be able to give testimony
necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence in a crim
inal case ... and the government invokes the privilege, the judge shall give
the government an opportunity to show in camera facts relevant to
determining whether the informer can, in fact, supply that testimony. The
showing will ordinarily be in the form of affidavits, but the judge may direct
that testimony be taken if he finds that the matter cannot be resolved satis
factOrily upon affidavit. If the judge finds that there is a reasonable probabil
ity that the informer can give the testimony, and the government elects not
to disclose his identity, the judge on motion of the defendant in a criminal
case shall dismiss the charges to which the testimony would relate, and the
judge may do so on his own motion. . . . Evidence submitted to the judge
shall be sealed and preserved to be made available to the appellate court in
the event of an appeal, and the contents shall not otherwise be revealed
without consent of the government. All counsel and parties shall be
permitted to be present at every stage of proceedings under this subdivision
except a showing in camera, at which no counselor party shall be permitted
to be present.
56 F.R.D. 183, 255-56 (1972).
122. United States v. Doe, 525 F.2d 878, 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
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hearing on the issue of disclosure does not of itself satisfy the
Roviaro balancing test. To hold against the defendant the trial
court, after considering all relevant factors, must find the govern
ment's reasons for denying disclosure to be substantiaP23
Although the in camera proceeding is not infallible, and in no
wise guarantees that a fair result will be reached, it enables the
trial court to make its decision from a far more informed position
than is otherwise possible. It allows the judge to ascertain the "rel
evant factors"124 significant to the issue of disclosure. If, after such
a proceeding, the court decides that the informant's testimony
would be "relevant and helpful" or necessary for a fair determina
tion, disclosure must be made, or the action must be dismissed.
The in camera hearing should be granted only after some
showing that the informant's testimony may be necessary to the de
fense; this showing cannot be based solely on speculation or con
jecture. The hearing provides a means to ascertain the need for the
testimony without doing violence to the public interest or unfairly
depriving the defendant of important evidence. The Wandix situa
tion is particularly suited to this form of determination, but neither
the trial court nor the Missouri Supreme Court considered the po
tential effectiveness of this option.
An in camera hearing on the question of disclosure would in
disputably allow a more expeditious and informed resolution of the
disclosure dilemma, but a significant problem remains, notably,
when to employ such procedures. Defense counsel and the courts
do not have suitable criteria to employ in determining when an in
camera interview of the informant is appropriate.

V.

DEFENSE BURDEN AND COURT'S DISCRETION

When disclosure was denied without the benefit of an in cam
era hearing, the Fifth Circuit foupd it appropriate .in at least one
instance to remand the case to the district court with directions to

976 (1976). Regarding an alibi defense, the court stated:
the district court correctly reasoned that disclosure would not be warranted
unless the informant either could not positively identify _Lujan ur possessed
some other evidence that would tend to exonerate the defendant. Both the
in camera interview and the test identification procedures provided the
court with precisely the sort of information upon which its ruling on disclo
sure should have been based....
Id. at 880.
123. United States v. Silva, 580 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1978).
124. 353 U.S. at 62.
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conduct a hearing and to supplement the record with findings
based upon the standards of Roviaro. 125 Such instructions are not
automatic, however, and the criteria courts use to resolve the
question are not consistent. 126 The showing that the defense must
make in order to be granted an in camera hearing on the question
of disclosure is uncertain, as Alvarez v. United States 127 reveals.
Defendant's failure to request an in camera hearing on the issue of
disclosure was held to be a ground for denying defense motions
seeking disclosure of the informant's identity, despite the fact that
the defense requested disclosure, based on Roviaro, five times
during trial. Even though the defense's intention was clear, the
judge failed to order a hearing on his own motion, though such an
option was within his discretion since he was charged with balancing
the conflicting interests.
Under the standards set forth in Roviaro and subsequent cases
approving the in camera procedure, the initial burden is on the de
fense to demonstrate the need for disclosure. It is generally con
ceded that the burden is not satisfied if the request is based solely
on speculation or conjecture128 for the defense must show the sub
stance and relevance of the informant's testimony in light of the af
firmative defense asserted. 129 What should be apparent, though it
is not always acknowledged, is that the defense must make less of a
showing to obtain an in camera hearing than to be granted an or
der for disclosure. Thus, although the initial burden is on the de
fendant, when his proof is marginal there is little reason to deny
resolution of the issue in camera, absent extraordinary circum
stances demonstrated by the prosecution.
A.

Mistaken Identity Defense

It is in the area of the defense burden that conflict may arise
concerning the sufficiency of the showing and the right of the ac
cused to refuse to testify. Such a conflict rarely arises in cases in
which the defense of mistaken identity is asserted. The defense, by

125. See United States v. Fischer, 531 F.2d 783 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Freund, 525 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1976).
126. See United States v. Smith, 595 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Gonzales, 606 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1979); Alvarez v. United States, 525 F.2d 980 (5th
_ Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995 (1976).
127. 525 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1976).
128. United States v. Estrella, 567 F.2d 1151, 1153 (1st Cir. 1977); United
States v. Kelly, 449 F.2d 329, 330 (9th Cir. 1971).
129. United States v. Hansen, 569 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1978).
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its very nature, usually entails the testimony of alibi witnesses who
are subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. In addition,
the testimony of alibi witnesses is scrutinized by jurors on the mat
ter of credibility. The court, however, should not permit such tes
timony to be summarily disregarded when the witnesses are
friends or acquaintances of the defendant, the usual sources of alibi
testimony. The prosecution has an opportunity to confront the
witnesses and to attack their credibility without subjecting the in
formant to similar confrontation. When an affirmative defense of
mistaken identity is presented and supported by witness testimony,
in the' interest of fairness. the judge should find that the defense
has met its burden and should require an in camera interview of
the informant. The court may then make an initial determination of
the level of the informant's involvement,130 the value of the in
formant's testimony to the defense,131 and the possibility that the
jury would find the testimony of the informant less credible than
that of the alibi witnesses,132 and then appraise such factors in light
of the government's reasons for nondisclosure.
The courts have shown a marked trend toward requiring hear
ings in cases where mistaken identity defenses are asserted,133 and
the circuit courts have remanded cases with directions to conduct
in camera interviews and to supplement the record with an order
that applies the balancing test of Roviaro. 134
In United States v. Fischer, 135 the trial judge refused to order
disclosure of the identity of an informant who introduced two
agents to defendant and was present at a series of negotiations
when drugs purportedly were tested but not purchased. The de
fense, alleging that no transaction took place, relied on the alibi
testimony of two women who were present at the first meeting
who stated that no incriminating conversations occurred and no co
caine changed hands. 136 The court of appeals considered the possi

130. United States v. Alonzo, 571 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
847 (1978).
131. United States v. Lloyd, 400 F.2d 414, 417 (6th Cir. 1968).
132. Gilmore v. United States. F.2d at 567.
133. Suarez v. United States, 582 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Silva, 580 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Doe, 525 F.2d 878 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975).
.
134. See United States v. Fischer, 531 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1976), and United
States v. Freund, 525 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1976).
135. 531 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1976).
136. ld. at 785.
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ble range of situations where the need for disclosure might arise,
as well as the likely disposition of each case. When the informant is
a m~re tipster, no disclosure is required under Roviaro. 137 If the
informant played a crucial role in the transaction, as he did in
Roviaro, disclosure and production would be crucial to a fair
trial. 13S If there is a slight possibility that the defendant might ben
efit from disclosure but the government demonstrates a compel
ling need to protect the informant's identity, disclosure is not
required. 139
The court determined that the record in Fischer was unclear
as to which category was applicable but found the informant's par
ticipation to be "active and significant. "140 The justices, however,
were unable to ascertain whether the informant's role alone
compelled disclosure, regardless of the government's showing in
opposition. Since the truthfulness of the defense witnesses was a
major issue and the court noted that an in camera hearing would
best accommodate the competing government and individual inter
ests, it remanded to the district court. The directions on remand
instructed that the trial judge should: (1) Question the informant in
camera to ascertain whether his testimony might be helpful to the
defendant; (2) question the informant and government counsel with
regard to the government interests in resisting disclosure; and (3)
supplement the record with an order that applied the Roviaro bal
ancing test to the facts of the case. 141
In United States v. Silva 142 the trial court denied disclosure
following a post-trial in camera interview with the informant. De
fendant alleged mistaken identity, contending a frame-up by the
police, by the informant, or by both. 143 He relied solely on his
own testimony. On appeal the court considered ~o of the three
factors noted in Roviaro: (1) The possible defenses of mistaken
identity, entrapment, or mistake as to the contents of the package
and (2) the potential significance of the informant's testimony.l44
Both were found to weigh heavily in favor of disclosure. l45 The
137. Id. at 787.
138. ld.
139. ld ..
140. ld.
141. ld. at 788.
142. 580 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1978).
143. The accused alleged that the .. 'frame-up' ... was due to his previous law
enforcement background." ld. at 146.
144. ld. at 147.
. 145. ld.
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court decided that, since defendant allegedly had no knowledge of
the transaction, he needed the informant's testimony to refute that
of the agent testifying for the prosecution. Alternatively, assuming
that -the absent informant would corroborate the agent's testimony,
the court found that the informant was "essential to enable the [de
fendant] to develop his theory that he had been framed. "146
Finally, the government failed to present any "other relevant fac
tors" to justify nondisclosure besides general policy,147 Therefore,
despite the fact that an in camera hearing had been conducted, dis
closure was denied improperly since the informant was the only
witness in a position to support or contradict the testimony of the
lone agent who participated in the transaction. 148
The mistaken identity and alibi defenses often provide the
court with additional methods, independent of the in camera hear
ing, to resolve the disclosure issue. Thus, in Suarez v. United
States,149 the identity of the informant was not essential to the de
fense since defendant could have called witnesses to testify regard
ing his activities on the numerous dates when he allegedly was in
volved in gambling ventures. Because of the availability of other
witnesses, the' informant was not the only possible source of excul
patory information. 15o In United States v. Doe 151 the Fifth Circuit
held that disclosure is not warranted when the defendant asserts an
alibi defense unless the informant could not positively identify the
defendant or t4e informant possessed some other evidence that
would tend to e~nerate the accused. 152

B.

Entrapment Defense

The decisions concerning in camera proceedings have been in
consistent and the standards applied have been less than clear
when other defenses are asserted, particularly the defense of
entrapment. The entrapment defense was enumerated specifically
in Roviaro as an affirmative defense that might require disclo
sure,153 but it has not been regarded so generously in subsequent
decisions. Even though evidence of entrapment is almost exclu
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id. at n.3.
Id. at 147.
582 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1012.
525 F.2d 878 (5th Cir.), cerro denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976).
152. Id. at 880.
153. 353 U.S. at 69.
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sively in the control of the government, the courts frequently re
quire the defense to introduce a significant amount of evidence be
fore they will order an in camera hearing regarding disclosure of
the informant's identity.
Entrapment is an affirmative defense upon which the defen
dant must present some testimony demonstrating government in
ducement and involvement before the issue is raised properly.
"[TJhis initial burden on the defendant to produce some evidence
of entrapment has important ramifications for disclosure of an in
formant's identity under Roviaro. Unless some evidence of en
trapment is adduced by the defendant, thereby properly raising
the defense, disclosure would be unjustifiable. "154 According to the
Fifth Circuit, the defense must present a prima facie case that the
government's conduct has created "a substantial risk that the of
fense would be committed by a person other than one ready to
commit it. "155 Because such information is often available only to
the prosecution, the defendant may be forced to testify in his own
behalf in order to adduce sufficient evidence to warrant an in cam
era hearing on the issue of disclosure and to properly place the de
fense in issue.
The defense dilemma in such cases is aggravated when two
unrelated defenses are put forth. In Alvarez v. United States, 156
defendant asserted a defense of entrapment and, alternatively, a
defense of insanity. The defense moved for disclosure five times
during the course of trial on the issue of entrapment. The sub
stance of each motion was that one of the agents who had partici
pated in the negotiations for the sale of drugs, most of which were
conducted in Spanish, died before trial. The agent who testified,
however, neither spoke nor understood Spanish. Defense counsel
sought to demonstrate that, since no other independent evidence
of entrapment existed, the informant's testimony was essential. De
fendant did not testify and disclosure was denied, without the
benefit of an in camera hearing, because the entrapment defense
had no basis in the evidence. 157 On appeal, defendant asserted that
he could not have testified on the question of entrapment since he
would have destroyed the good faith of his insanity defense. The
154.
155.
423 U.S.
1969)).
156.
157.

United States v. Gonzales, 606 F.2d 70, 75 (5th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
826 (1975) (quoting Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir.
525 F.2d at 980.
Id. at 981.

764

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:739

court of appeals found that the defense had not met its initial bur
den because it should have requested an in camera hearing on the
issue of disclosure if it had been so concerned with preserving the
good faith of the insanity defense. ISS Thus, if disclosure were
permitted in this case, the identity of informants would have to be
disclosed whenever the twin defenses of insanity and entrapment
were asserted. 159
A conflict arises when the defendant alleges entrapment or as
serts two alternative defenses, and also seeks disclosure of an in
formant's identity: the defendant may be forced to compromise his
fifth amendment right to refuse to testify. "While a defendant's si
lence is not inherently inconsistent with a defense of entrapment,
. . . such silence cannot provide the grounds for disclosure . . . . If
disclosure was required whenever a defendant elected not to testifY
and to allege entrapment, then the Government's interest in con
fidentiality could not be adequately safeguarded. "160 The court did
not suggest that one method that might be utilized to resolve this
conflict would be to conduct an in camera hearing on the issue of
disclosure.
The Fifth Circuit failed to resolve this question in United
States v. Godkins,161 in which defendant asserted that he knew the
informant and intended to call him as a witness to develop a de
fense of entrapment. The trial court forbade the defense, under
penalty of contempt, from producing the informant as a witness at
trial. In addition, during a meeting in chambers the judge prohib
ited any defense examination of a government agent on matters
pertaining to the informant's identity, reliability, or the level of his
involvement in the crime charged. Perhaps ,most significant, the
trial court ruled that defendant could not testifY in camera as to the
informant's identity, which he claimed he knew, without waiving
his privilege against self-incrimination at trial. The accused thus
was forced to rely on a defense of insanity. 162
On appeal the court failed to lend any guidance to defense
counsel or the trial court. The Fifth Circuit simply ruled that dis
closure must be made. 163 The court noted that the concerns that
prompted the Roviaro test are not present when the identity of the
158.
159.
160.
161.

ld. at 982.
ld. at 983.
United States v. Gonzales, 606 F.2d 70, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1979).
527 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1976).
162. ld. at 1323.
163. ld. at 1326.

1981]

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

765

informant is known to the defendant since the defense is simply
seeking to exercise its sixth amendment right to call a witness and
is not seeking disclosure of a confidential informant. l64 Although
the defendant's rights were suitably protected by such a result, the
state's interests arguably were not, as noted by the specially con
curring opinion. 16S No aid was provided for handling similar con
flicts' in the future.
The Fifth Circuit retained its rigid approach to the entrapment
defense in United States v. Gonzalez,166 which involved four meet
ings between an undercover agent and defendant. Informants at
tended all four meetings. 167 In denying disclosure, the court noted
that entrapment is an affirmative defense that is properly raised
only when the defendant introduces evidence that he was induced
to commit the offense. 168 The court further observed that defen
dant did not testify on his own behalf and that no specific facts were
asserted that the informant's testimony might establish.
In Encinas-Sierras v. United States, 169 defendant asserted
entrapment and lack of knowledge of the contents of the package as
defenses to a charge of unlawfully importing heroin. Both defenses
were specifically noted in Roviaro. 170 Defendant in Encinas
testified on his own behalf concerning the events leading to his
capture by border guards who had received his description from an
informant. Defendant also maintained that he had acquired the
package only ten minutes prior to crossing the border. The border
guard testified that the informant and the man defendant identified
as the source of the package were not the same person. l71 Thus on
the question of entrapment, without the aid of an in camera hear
ing, the court refused to require disclosure since the informant was
not the person who induced defendant to act.172 Disclosure also .
was denied on the second defense for the court found that the in
formant could not testify as to defendant's lack of knowledge of the
package's contents or to his state of mind because both were ques
tions of fact for the jury.173
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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ld. at 1328.
606 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1979).
ld. at 73-74.
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401 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1968).
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It is easy to understand the court's reluctance to require dis
closure of an informant's identity whenever the defense of en
trapment is alleged. It is harder to justify denial of an in camera
hearing on the issue of disclosure, which is merely the vehicle for
fairly resolving the more important question: The significance of
the informant's testimony to the defense. In such cases it is clear .
that only the government is privy to the substance of the infor
mant's testimony and, ultimately, the inner machinations resulting in
the defendant's arrest. The possibility also exists that the informant
effected the entrapment without the knowledge of the agents with·
whom he was working, thereby making disclosure imperative. The
defense of entrapment is available if the paid informant supplied
the drugs, "even if the informer entrapped the defendant on his
own initiative, and regardless of whether any Government officer
knows the source of the contraband. "174
The fact that such cases do arise, though infrequently, sug
gests that a defense of entrapment should not be discounted by the
courts, particularly when the defendant testifies on his own behalf.
The Fifth Circuit has not gone so far as the dicta in United States
v. Gomez-Rojas 17S suggested it might: "[w]here a defendant char
ges that a paid Government informer has entrapped him, Roviaro
ordinarily demands disclosure of the informer's identity, since the
defendant's entire defense rests upon allegations which the in
former is in a unique position to affirm or deny."176 Such a view
admittedly is extreme and, if followed, would effectively eliminate
the government's use of informants in areas in which their employ
ment is particularly vital. Such an attitude, however, should be
viewed as a tacit recommendation of the in camera hearing as a
measure that fairly and effectively resolves the question of disclo
sure without such drastic implications.
The Washington Supreme Court sought to clarify the issues
presented when the defense moves for disclosure of an informant's
identity. That court has found that the purpose of the informer's
privilege with its necessary limitations as set forth in Roviaro 177 is
eminently satisfied by conducting an in camera hearing on the
question.1 78 In State v. Harris 179 the Washington Supreme Court
174.
423 U.S.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
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observed that "the preferred method for making this determination
without prejudicing the rights of either the state or the defendant
is for the court to hold an in camera session at which the judge
hears the informer's testimony and applies the Roviaro
standard."180 The courts following Harris recognized that the bur
den that the defense must satisfy before a hearing will be ordered
was still uncertain. In State v. Potter 181 the Washington Court of
Appeals sought to clarify this issue and to introduce consistency to
this troublesome area.
The trial court should apply a relevancy standard in exercising
its discretion as to whether to hold an in camera hearing. The
court should conduct an in camera hearing if the defendant
makes an initial showing that the confidential informant may
have evidence that would be relevant to the defendant's inno
cence. 182

Applying the Roviaro balancing test in camera allows the triai
court to make an "informed determination of whether the State's
interest in refusing disclosure outweighs the interests of the de
fendant. "183
VI.

CONCLUSION

Potter converts the general "relevant and helpful" standard of
Roviaro into a two-step process: The court first determines
whether the informant may possess evidence that is relevant to the
defendant's innocence; if he does, then an in camera hearing will
be granted to ascertain whether disclosure should be ordered. The
relevancy standard eases the initial burden of the defense to estab
lish the need for an in camera hearing. This approach has much to
recommend it in light of the problems previously noted: The possi
bility of alternative defenses; the fifth amendment right of the ac
cused to refuse to testify; the possible motives and interests of the
informant; and the unique problems of the entrapment defense.
The Potter approach is preferable because the disclosure decision
will be made only after an actual balancing that is performed in the
absence of the informant's testimony. In addition, the record of the
hearing is preserved for appeal by either party. This permits the
reviewing court to determine whether a proper balance was struck.

180.
181.
182.
183.

[d. at 150, 588 P.2d at 723.
25 Wash. App. 624, 611 P.2d 1282 (1980).
[d. at 628, 611 P.2d at 1284.
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Such in camera hearings do not require a relaxing of the Roviaro
standards or 'a wholesale disregard of the state's interests and the
informant's safety. Rather, they produce an informed judicial deci
sion concerning the rights and interests of the parties. This ap
proach recognizes the government's need for the informant and
satisfies the primary purpose of the informer's privilege: To encour
age the flow of information concerning possible violations of law to
law enforcement officials. As noted by the Fifth Circuit:
[t]he drug scene . . . [is] . . . a dark side of the contemporary
American landscape . . . . [tlhe faceless informant is one of its
standard inhabitants. Moved by a desire for vengeance or for
money, by the hope of leniency for his own misdeeds, by revul
sion at drug trafficking, or by any combination of the above, he
is a resource of police intelligence information apparently indis
pensable to their penetration of this criminal subculture. 184

Byron D. Caplice

184. United States v. Webster, 606 F.2d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing
granted, 611 F.2d 623 (1980).

